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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff7Appellee, ) 
) CaseNo.970656CA 
v. ) 
JAMES PATRICK IVIE, ) Priority Two 
) (Defendant Not Incarcerated) 
Defendant. ) 
Brent A. Gold, attorney for James Patrick Ivie, hereby respectfully submits this 
Petition for Rehearing pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
INTRODUCTION 
Ivie was arrested for DUI by Utah Highway Patrol Officer Marx after Marx 
confronted Ivie at a Circle K parking lot for a license plat problem (R. 434-423). 
The defense acknowledged Ivie had been drinking beer, but asserted that his 
companion Kristin had driven to the parking space and had the keys; and that when 
Marx confronted Ivie the motor was not running and the vehicle had not moved. (R. 
614, 612, 610, 609, 608, 596, 579, 576, 575, 573, 569, 567; Opening Brief, p. 6-9). 
I I 
A negative relationship going back to a fist fight in junior high between Marx and Ivie 
was offered as a motive for Marx's fabrication of the charge. (R. 582-581). 
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Over Ivie's objection, the trial court received part of Marx's DUI report as an 
exhibit pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) under the theory it was a prior 
statement of Marx's that was consistent with his in-court testimony. (R. 545-530). 
The exhibit contained Marx's version of Ivie's post-arrest interview, including 
explicit and implicit admissions of driving. It also contained Marx's statement of his 
observation that the "vehicle was running and began to move." (Exhibit 9 is included 
with the trial exhibits at R. 118 and reproduced in the Opening Brief Addendum). 
The report was used extensively throughout the trial (e.g. line-by-line reading on 
state's direct examination of Marx, R. 415-412; state's cross-examination of Ivie R. 
566-563; state's case in rebuttal, R. 545; receipt of exhibit and repeat of line-by-line 
reading, R. 529-524; state's re-direct of Marx in rebuttal, R. 514-513; state's further 
rebuttal, R. 508-507). The exhibit was also referred to several times in the 
prosecutor's closing argument (R. 500, 499, 493, 491 & 477) and taken by the jury 
into their deliberations (R. 474 & 464). 
Appeal was taken on issues involving Utah Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), 
803(5) and 403. A Memorandum Decision filed December 10, 1998, found harmless 
error under Rule 803(5), not reaching a decision under 801(d)(1)(B) and 403. 
(Addendum A). A motion and stipulation was filed for enlargement of time until 
January 15, 1999 to file this petition. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Ivie agrees the court properly ruled that receiving the DUI report as an exhibit 
violated Rule 803(5), but believes the court did not apply proper analysis in finding 
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harmless error. The standard the court used to determine harmless error was not 
appropriate to this case. Additionally, the court did not apprehended the importance 
of the improperly admitted report as the centerpiece of the state's case and the court 
overlooked the facts that the exhibit was emphasized with multiple references in the 
prosecutor's closing argument and taken into the jury room as a concise one-sided 
version of the evidence. Ivie also believes the court did not give due consideration to 
the weaknesses of the states supporting witnesses. 
By failing to address the pre-motive requirement of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and the 
abuse of the trial court's discretion under Rule 403, the court leaves the door open for 
continued improper bolstering of witnesses through police reports and other written 
synopses of in-court testimony that are provided to the jury during deliberations. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The court's decision reflects a misapplication of the 
standard for determining harmless error and overlooks 
the particular circumstances of the error in this case . 
Page two of the Memorandum Decision of this court sets forth a barrage of 
touchstones for determining harmless error: "...no reasonable likelihood exists that 
the error affected the outcome..."; ".. .there is convincing properly admitted evidence 
of all essential elements../'; "...whether the jury would have convicted the defendant 
even without admission of the report..."; " sufficient evidence and eyewitness 
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testimony to convict ...";"••• erroneously admitted evidence was cumulative of other 
testimony." 
In the midst of this barrage, the court adopts the principle that "[W]hether a 
new trial is warranted in this case depends on whether the result in the case would 
have been more favorable to the defendant if the report had been excluded; that is, 
whether the jury would have convicted defendant even without admission of the 
report." (Mem. Dec, p.2). This is not the appropriate test for this case. 
The normal standard for reviewing the harmfulness of evidentiary errors is 
whether there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant in 
the absence of such error. (Opening Brief, p. 3, citing State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2nd 
388, 407 (Utah 1989); and State v. Lenaburg, 781 P.2nd 432, 436-437 (Utah 1989). 
Also see State v. Stefaniak, 900 P. 2d 1094 (Utah App. 1995) where a different panel 
of this court applied Rimmasch to find prejudicial error in admitting evidence on 
witness credibility.) 
This standard was not applied by the court. Requiring that the result "would 
have been more favorable" does not include the quantifying parameter of "a 
reasonable likelihood" of a more favorable result. In fact, it includes no parameters 
at all. No level of certainty is provided for the court's conclusion that "exclusion of 
the report would not have resulted in a more favorable outcome." 
Making matters worse, the court appears to have actually decided the case 
using a test in the form of a three stage finding that lacks logical continuity to support 
a determination of harmless . 
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As best as Ivie can discern, the ruling of the court is based on findings that 1.) 
there was "sufficient evidence to convict without the admission of the report;" 2.) "the 
information contained in report was cumulative;" and that 3.) "Accordingly, because 
exclusion of the report would not have resulted in a more favorable outcome for the 
defendant and because the jury had already heard the contents of the report several 
times, admission of the report, while error, was harmless." What's wrong with this 
picture? 
First, the initial finding of sufficient evidence (as well as the second and third 
findings) do not reflect the proper inquiry because it does not consider the likelihood 
of a more favorable result in the absence of error. No consideration is given to how 
the exhibit bolstered the state's case and undermined the case of Ivie. (For example, 
the state's use of the exhibit in closing argument to show Kristin was not driving that 
night because the report does not say she made such a statement; that Ivie lied about 
not driving because the report says he admitted driving; that the vehicle moved 
because the report says it moved, etc.). 
Second, the finding that the report was cumulative simply begs the issue of its 
bolstering impact and its receipt in a form that allows the state's principal witnesses to 
follow the jury into the jury room. The whole essence of the holding of harmful error 
in cases such as Pendas-Martinez, Brown, Ware and Quinto, infra, is that cumulative 
evidence in the form of a concise written statement of the government's case followed 
the jury into their deliberations. Ivie's side of the case had no such benefit. 
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Third, to the extent that findings 1 and 2 do reflect proper inquiry, the 
combining of these findings do not logically result in the ultimate finding that 
"exclusion of the report would not have resulted in a more favorable outcome for 
defendant." The process of determining if the exclusion of improper evidence 
"would have been more favorable to the defendant" requires relative analysis of the 
strength of the defendant's case; an inquiry into how the improper evidence bolstered 
the state's side; consideration of how it undermined the side of the defendant, etc. 
The court's Memorandum Decision does not reflect this process and does not 
establish any parameters of certainty (reasonable likelihood) that the result would not 
have been more favorable absent evidentiary error. (For a general discussion of 
determining if error warrants reversal, see State v. Knight, 134 P.2d 913, at 919 et seq. 
(Utah 1987) and State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898, at 902 et seq. (Utah App. 1996). 
Also see State v. Verde, 110 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)cited on page 3 of Ivie's 
Opening Brief for the abuse of discretion standard of review.) 
State v. Thomas, 111 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah 1989) cited on page two of this 
court's Memorandum Decision is not properly determinative in the instant case. 
Thomas dealt with oral testimony. Neither Thomas nor any of the other harmless 
error cases cited in the court's Memorandum Decision involve the type of written 
exhibit in the instant case that constitutes a concise statement of the state's evidence 
on the only contested element of the offence and followed the jury into the jury room 
after repeated requests that it be read during their deliberations. 
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Pendas-Martinez, Ware, Brown and Quinto and Peterson, infra, illustrate the 
particular analysis the court should have given to determining the prejudicial impact 
of the error in the instant case: 
1. the prosecutor made repeated reference to the exhibit in closing arguments 
and urged the jury to read it during their deliberations; and 
2. the exhibit followed the jury into the jury room as a concise statement 
establishing the only contested element needed to convict. 
No consideration was given to these circumstances in this court's decision. 
B. The court's decision does not analyze the harmful impact 
of the improperly admitted exhibit following the jury into 
the jury room as a concise statement of the state's case 
against Ivie. 
Before trial, and throughout the proceedings, the central issue in this case 
focused on whether Ivie had operated the vehicle. (Opening Brief, p. 32-33). 
Although a relatively close result at .092 (Exhibit 2 at R. 118), the alcohol test was 
not seriously contested. (Opening Brief, p. 25, citing R. 490, In. 23-25). 
The court's Memorandum Decision filed December 10, 1998, fails to consider 
the fact that the improperly admitted exhibit followed the jury into their deliberations 
as a concise presentation of evidence on the only seriously contested element of the 
case. None of the cases cited by the court deal with the prejudicial impact of having 
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such an improper and damaging exhibit in the jury's hands during their determination 
of the case. 
"[SJince police reports of factual events and details of a criminal case are 
generally made for the purpose of successfully prosecuting a crime, the reasons which 
might otherwise provide a basis to assume reliability of such reports as business 
records do not exist where police reports are offered by the prosecution in criminal 
proceeding." State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1983). Ivie requested this 
court take note of this aspect of the DUI report, and also consider the cases cited on 
pages 28-29 of Ivie's Opening Brief: United States v. Pendas-Martinez, 845 F.2nd 938 
(11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Brown, 451 F.2nd 1231 (5th Cir. 1971) and United 
States v. Ware, 247 F.2nd 678 (7th Cir. 1957). 
The court's Memorandum Decision overlooks any of the analysis provided by 
these cases for determining the harmfiilness of error when an improperly received 
exhibit such as in the instant case is taken into the jury room. In line with these 
cases, the court's attention is also invited to United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224 (2nd 
Cir. 1978), citing , Ware, Brown, et al., and stating: 
[T]he specificity with which the document relates the entire course of 
the interview, the questions propounded by the interrogators and 
Quinto's responses to those inquiries, leads us to believe that it would 
indeed be the unusual juror who would be unimpressed and 
uninfluenced by the memorandum .... 
* * * * * * * * * 
"[t]he jury thus had before it a neat condensation of the government's 
whole case against the defendant. The governments witnesses in effect 
accompanied the jury into the jury room. In these circumstances we 
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cannot say that the error did not influence the jury, to the defendant's 
detriment, or had but very slight effect." United States v. Ware, 247 
F.2d 698, 700-01 (7th Cir. 1957); accord, United States v. Brown, 451 
F.2d 1231, 1233-34 (5th Cir. 1971); Sanchez v. United States, 293 F.2d 
260, 267-70 (8th Cir. 1961); see United States v. Frattini, 501 F.2d 
1234, 1235-36 (2d Cir. 1974); see also United States v. Adams, supra, 
385 F.2d at 550-51 (Friendly, J.). Moreover, the error is not rendered 
harmless by the fact that IRS "agents had testified and were cross-
examined on the same subjects.11 United States v. Adams, supra, 385 
F.2d at 551 (interpreting Ware and Sanchez)', accord, United States v. 
Ware, supra, 247 F.2d at 700-01; United States v. Brown, supra, 451 
F.2datl234. 
582 F. 2d 224, at 235-6. (Underlining added.) 
The DUI report in the instant case contains all of the arresting officer's version 
of his post arrest interview, plus the officer's comments that the vehicle was running 
and began to move. The exhibit was a "neat condensation" of the case against Ivie 
on the only contested element of the offence. The court should have analyzed this 
point and granted a new trial. 
C. The court's decision overlooks the emphasis placed on the 
exhibit by prosecutor during closing arguments. 
The prosecutor emphasized the DUI Report to the jury no less than five times 
during closing argument. This included references to show the vehicle move, that 
Ivie had admitted driving and that Kristin's testimony about telling Marx she was 
driving that night could not have been true because it was not included in the report. 
In four of these instances the prosecutor explicitly or implicitly told the jury to review 
the report during their deliberations. This was presented in pages 24-25 and 27 of 
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Appellant's Opening Brief with trial transcript excerpts and references (R. 500, 499, 
493, 491 & 477-6). 
Pages 26 and 27 of Appellant's Opening Brief cites Peterson v. State, 744 P.2d 
1259 (Nev. 1987). The Nevada court in Peterson reversed the conviction, placing 
weight on the fact that reemphasizing improperly admitted evidence during closing 
argument magnifies the prejudicial effect. 
This court's decision overlooks the magnifying impact of prejudice when 
improperly admitted evidence is reemphasized in closing arguments. 
D. The court's decision reflects a misapprehension of the 
prominent roll the exhibit played in the state's case. 
The interview section of the report was given a line-by-line reading in the 
state's case in principle (R. 415-412) and used to cross-examine Ivie (R. 566-563). 
After the trial court's ruling to receive the interview section of the report, the 
prosecutor successfully urged the judge to include Marx's comments on the back page 
report because it "...shows the motor was running, which is an important part of the 
case." (R. 538) 
The report was rehashed again almost line-for-line after its receipt as an exhibit 
(R. 529-524), It was also used to support the state's contention the "vehicle was 
running and began to move"; to support Marx's version of the post arrest interview 
and that of Ivie; and to discredit defense testimony by the absence of any reference in 
the report to the fact that Ivie's companion Kristin was driving that night (R. 514-13, 
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508-507; Opening Brief, p. 24; and Reply Brief, p. 20). The prosecutor couldn't wait 
to get it in the jury's hands at the end of the state's case in rebuttal (R. 513) 
As noted in Point B above and with transcript excerpt in pages 24-25 of Ivie's 
Opening Brief, the prosecutor also used the report at least five times during his jury 
summation and urged the jury to read the exhibit. 
Ivie respectfully submits that this court's characterization of the exhibit as 
merely "cumulative" misapprehends the prominent roll played by the DUI report in 
the state's case. 
E. The court overlooked the weaknesses in the state's 
witnesses supporting the arresting officer. 
The court's Memorandum Decision notes there was testimony from three 
officers. Marx's ride-a-long friend, Purdy, was an officer at the time of trial, but not 
at the time of Ivie's arrest. Officer Isaccson was taking a break with Marx and Purdy 
at the Circle K and did the vehicle impound. Ivie believes this court misapprehended 
the relative importance of Purdy and Isaccson vis-a-vis the roll of the DUI report 
exhibit; and the court overlooked Pages 30-32 of Ivie's Opening Brief highlights parts 
of record relevant to the credibility of these two witnesses. (R. 697, 690, 689, 688, 
684, 681, 680, 679, 678, 645, 643-640). 
In a nutshell, Isaccson and Purdy were excluded from the courtroom while not 
testifying and they remembered almost nothing surrounding the arrest except for the 
brief window of time reflected in Marx's comments on the back page of the DUI 
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report. Isaccson never made a report, but read Marx's report before preliminary 
hearing. (R. 695, 692 & 691). Purdy wrote a statement several months later (after 
Marx had made comments to him about the case). (R. 651, 648-646). (And compare 
Purdy's testimony he saw exhaust coming from the license plate area (R. 652) with 
the testimony of I vie (R. 566) and Kristin Rogers (R. 601) that the exhaust exits on 
the side between the front and rear tiers.) 
F. The court's decision does not consider the length of the jury's 
deliberations. 
Page 29 of Ivie's Opening Brief cites State v. Barker, 797 P.2nd 452, at 455 
(Utah App. 1990) as authority for considering the length of jury deliberations in 
analyzing the possibility of a more favorable result in the absence of error. 
Deliberations in this case lasted over two and a half hours. (R. 460). This unusually 
long time for a DUI case is emphasized by the fact that the only element the jury 
needed to resolve was whether Ivie had driven the vehicle. 
The length of deliberations in this case, weaknesses in the testimony of Purdy 
and Isaccson and the bolstering impact of the DUI report strongly support the 
likelihood of a more favorable result if the state had not been allowed to submit and 
argue the DUI report and the jury had not had the use of the report during their 
deliberations. 
G. The court should have clarified Utah law under Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) and common law impeachment rehabilitation. 
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Ivie submits that Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) embodies a requirement 
that statements used to rehabilitate a charge of improper motive must have been made 
prior to the existence of the motive. This rule has century old roots in Utah law and 
has recently been confirmed as the federal standard. Silva v. Pickard, 10 Utah 78, 37 
P. 86 (1894); State v. Carrington, 15 Utah 480, 50 P. 526 (1897); and Tome v. United 
States, 513 U.S. 150, 130 L. Ed. 2nd 574, 115 S.Ct. 696 (1995). (Opening Brief, Point 
1, pages 13-17; Reply Brief, Point IB, pages 7-17). 
The state claims there is no pre-motive requirement (Brief of Appellee, Point 
IB, p. 16-24) and cites State v. Sibert, 310 P. 2d 388 (Utah 1957), State v. Asay, 631 
P. 2d. 861 (Utah 1981), et al. Ivie disagrees with this assertion and distinguishes the 
cases relied on by the state. (Reply Brief, Point IB, p. 7-17). 
Both parties agree that no reported Utah case after the adoption of Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) has directly addressed the issue. 
The court's failure to rule on this important point fosters uncertainty at the trial 
level as to the pre-motive requirements for impeachment rehabilitation under either 
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or a common law rule that might circumvent 801(d)(l)((B) if 
rehabilitation testimony or exhibits are not received as substantive evidence. 
H. By overlooking the trial court's abuse of discretion under 
Rule 403, the court's decision effectively sanctions a 
departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings. 
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This case involved a particularly egregious example of allowing the state to 
improperly bolster its witnesses. (Opening Brief, Point III, pages 20-23; Reply Brief, 
Point B 1, pages 8-9). This court's failure to address the trial court's abuse of 
discretion in receiving the DUI report as an exhibit sends a permissive message that 
similar bolstering scenarios can be allowed with the assurance the error will be 
deemed harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
This court applied an inappropriate standard for determining harmless error 
and overlooked the critical roll the improperly admitted exhibit played in the state's 
case. 
The court's failure to thoroughly address the issues in this case sets a stage for 
chaos in the trial court. Although the court's December 10, 1998 Memorandum 
Decision is not for official publication, the impact is ultimately the same as a 
published pronouncement: permissiveness at the appellate level redefines the accepted 
the usual course of proceedings in the courts below. The tactical scenario for future 
trials? Both parties prepare a written statement of their version of the facts; wait for 
the other side to challenge their testimony; then introduce the prepared statement as 
exhibit to accompany the jury during their deliberations. Those with a proclivity for 
fabrication are particularly well rewarded. The more egregious the lie, the more 
likely its receipt as a written exhibit to rehabilitate the same version of oral testimony. 
The jury in this case was out for over two and a half hours. The alcohol test 
was not seriously challenged. The only element in need of resolution was whether 
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Ivie was driving or in actual physical control. The presentation of Ivie's case ended in 
the courtroom; but the state's case followed the jury into their deliberations on the 
heals of the prosecutor's requests that Marx's report be read to prove the vehicle 
moved, that Ivie had admitted driving and that Kristin had never told Marx she was 
driving that night. We do not know the details of the jury's deliberations or how 
many votes might have been taken, but we do know that Marx's report was there until 
the end. (R. 474-464). 
Ivie was not afforded a level field of play and respectfully requests the court to 
reconsider the prejudicial use of the DUI report, apply the appropriate standard and 
considerations for determining harmful error and grant a new trial. 
Dated this 15th day of January, 1999. 
\ < J 9 1 D # 1 2 1 3 ^ - / ^ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH 
Brent A. Gold, attorney for Petitioner James Patrick Ivie, hereby certifies the 
foregoing Petition for Rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
Dated this 15th day of January, 1999. 
B k E r ^ A ^ G O I J f r t e 13 ^ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that <?n this 15th day of January, 1999, I caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief to be mailed by first class U.S. mail with 
sufficient pre-paid postage to counsel for Appellee, Laura B. Dupaix, Assistant Attorney 
General, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854. 
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ADDENDUM 
FILED 
DEC 1 0 1998 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
James Patrick Ivie, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
COURT OF APPEALS 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 971656-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 10, 1998) 
Eighth District, Roosevelt Department 
Honorable A. Lynn Payne 
Attorneys: Brent A. Gold and Raymond S. Shuey, Park City, for 
Appellant 
Jan Graham and Laura B. Dupaix, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Davis, Billings, and Greenwood. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant, James Patrick Ivie, appeals his conviction of 
driving under the influence of alcohol, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 1998). We affirm. 
Defendant argues that, under Utah Rule of Evidence 803(5), 
the court should have excluded the DUI Report (the report) made 
on the night of his arrest. While trial courts are generally 
accorded broad discretion in making evidentiary rulings, see 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994), a trial court's 
application of a particular rule of evidence is subject to a 
correction of error standard. See Corbett v. Seamons. 904 P.2d 
229, 232 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Because defendant challenges the 
trial court's application of Rule 803(5) in admitting the report, 
we review the trial court's evidentiary ruling for correctness. 
At trial, Officer Marx read from his report to refresh his 
recollection of defendant's exact answers to the interview 
questions asked on the night of the arrest. Although a 
memorandum used to refresh a witness's recollection may be read 
into evidence, it "may not itself be received as an exhibit 
unless offered by an adverse party." Utah R. Evid. 803(5) 
error did not prejudice defendant, we deny defendant's request 
for a new trial and affirm his conviction. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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